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Introduction
In Jitendrabhai Mohanbhai Kriplani v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (R/Criminal Misc. Application No. 21846 of 2022), the Gujarat High Court, on 7 September 2026, quashed an FIR under the Copyright Act, 1957, against a shopkeeper accused of selling counterfeit Apple accessories. The Court held that hardware such as AirPods, cables and chargers is not a “work” protected by copyright, and that a trademark dispute cannot be dressed up as a copyright offence to bypass the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The petition invoked Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 BNSS), the High Court’s inherent power against abuse of process.
Facts of the Case
Griffin Intellectual Property Service Pvt. Ltd., a Mumbai firm, was authorised by Apple Inc. to act against sellers of counterfeit Apple products, under a Special Power of Attorney dated 15 October 2022 valid for two years. Its manager received information that shops on Relief Road, Kalupur, Ahmedabad, including “Raj Cover House” in Murtimant Complex, were selling counterfeit Apple accessories; a private inquiry confirmed this.
The manager applied in writing to the Deputy Commissioner of Police for permission to inspect the shops. The application was forwarded to Kalupur Police Station, whose Police Inspector directed him to the Kalupur Chowki Surveillance Squad. Its officer in charge assembled police personnel, company representatives and two independent panchas, and ordered a raid.
On 19 October 2022, the team searched Raj Cover House, where the petitioner was present. Police seized AirPods, USB cables, power adapters, smartwatches and stickers (logo, MRP, barcode, seal) valued at Rs. 15,11,193. FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022 was registered at Kalupur Police Station under Sections 51, 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act, led by a Police Inspector, without any opinion from the Registrar of Trade Marks. At the FIR stage, the petitioner moved the High Court directly.
Argument in Favour
The petitioner argued that copyright protects only original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works under Section 13, read with Sections 2(c) (artistic work), 2(h) (dramatic work), 2(m) (infringing copy) and 2(o) (literary work, including computer programs, tables and compilations). AirPods, cables, adapters and watches fall within none of these, so the ingredients of Sections 51, 63 and 64 were absent. He also invoked Section 15: copyright in a design ceases once applied to an article more than fifty times industrially.
Alternatively, if the case concerns trademark counterfeiting under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act (punishing false trademarks and selling goods bearing them), Section 115(4) was breached. It requires the Registrar’s opinion before search and seizure, and allows warrantless searches only by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP).
He relied on Mihir Surendrabhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, 2023 (3) GLH 575; Binita Rahul Shah v. State of Gujarat, 2009 (0) AIJEL-HC 221331; Mayur Kanaiyalal Shah v. State of Gujarat, 2023 (0) AIJEL-HC 247430; Nainesh Chinubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2013 (0) AIJEL-HC 230395; Dagubhai Musabhai Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, 2023 (0) AIJEL-HC 247011; Reckeweg and Co. GmbH v. Adven Biotech Pvt. Ltd., MANU/DE/0961/2008; Sandip Ramashankar Dube v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Application (APL) No. 1541 of 2025 (Bombay HC); Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-12823-2021 (O&M) (Punjab & Haryana HC); and Maya Appliances Private Limited v. Pigeon Appliances Private Limited, 2004 (4) CTC 334.
Argument Against
The complainant and the State submitted that the Special Power of Attorney duly authorised the complainant to lodge the FIR. They argued that “literary work” is inclusive and needs no literary merit, only origin in the author, so stickers, MRP labels, packaging, product literature and instruction manuals were Apple’s literary or artistic works. Under Section 14, giving the owner exclusive rights over the work, copying them without licence infringed Section 51 and was punishable under Section 63. A wrong label of statutory provisions in an FIR, they added, should not stop prosecution where facts disclose trademark falsification.
They relied on Agarwala Publishing House, Khurja v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P., 1966 SCC OnLine All 124; Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Amazestore, MANU/DE/1390/2019; and Microsoft Corporation v. Mr. Deepak Raval, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 1670.
Court’s Decision
The Court held that Section 13, read with Section 2(c), confines copyright to original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, sound recordings and cinematograph films. Cables, adapters and devices are industrial products; duplicating them under a brand name is trademark falsification under Sections 103-104 of the Trade Marks Act, not a copyright offence. It followed Binita Rahul Shah for holding spare parts are not artistic or literary work, and Mayur Kanaiyalal Shah and Dagubhai Musabhai Sheikh for holding that selling duplicate goods does not automatically infringe copyright, and Section 63 charges fail without subsisting copyright. Sandip Dube was followed for the rule that a registered trademark on counterfeit goods attracts the Trade Marks Act.
On the stickers and labels, the FIR described the goods only as infringing Apple’s copyright and bearing its trademark, without stating Apple held copyright in any specific literary or artistic work. MRP tags, barcodes and model stickers carry factual, functional data, not original literary works under Section 2(o). The instruction-manual argument failed: no manual or leaflet was seized, and photographs filed later by affidavit were outside the investigation papers. Packaging and logos are commercial identifiers under Section 2(zb) of the Trade Marks Act.
The Court distinguished the complainant’s cases. Agarwala Publishing House concerned question papers and books with genuine literary authorship. Koninklijke Philips was a civil suit where copyright in user guides and packaging design was proved by evidence, not authority that a criminal FIR under Section 63 survives without pleading or seizing such material. Microsoft Corporation involved counterfeit software, and software is expressly a literary work under Section 2(o), unlike hardware. The Section 15 plea was not separately decided.
The Court rejected the objection to the complainant’s authority, since the agency’s authority extends to persons it authorises. The petitioner’s cases on written authority (Mihir Surendrabhai Shah, Nainesh Chinubhai Patel, Reckeweg and Maya Appliances) did not assist him here.
The Court also refused to let the prosecution fall back on trademark offences. Section 115(4) requires the Registrar’s opinion before any search, and bars officers below DSP rank from searching without warrant. There was no such opinion, and the raid was led by a Police Inspector with constables, all below that rank. Following Mihir Surendrabhai Shah and Ashok Kumar, the Court held these safeguards mandatory, voiding the search.
Finally, the Court found a colourable exercise of power: knowing that a Trade Marks Act raid needed the Registrar’s opinion and a DSP-rank officer, the complainant dressed up a trademark dispute as copyright infringement to obtain a quick raid through local police. A fallback to trademark charges would sanction evasion of the statute.
Conclusion
The High Court allowed the petition, quashed FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022 and all consequential proceedings, and made the Rule absolute.
The judgment draws a clear line between copyright and trademark law: copyright protects original works of authorship, while trademark law addresses misuse of brand identifiers. Selling counterfeit accessories falls under the Trade Marks Act, not the Copyright Act, unless the complaint identifies a specific protected work that was copied. It also affirms that the Registrar’s opinion and a DSP-rank officer are preconditions for search and seizure, not to be bypassed by invoking a different statute.
For brand owners, the decision underscores the need to plead specific copyrighted material and follow the Trade Marks Act procedure for counterfeit goods. For traders, it confirms that courts will use Section 482 Cr.P.C. to end prosecutions resting on the wrong statute or an unlawful search.
