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Introduction

In Japan Tobacco Inc. and Anr. v. The Central Warehouse and Anr., C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 814/2022, the Delhi High Court on 5 October 2026 dismissed a petition to remove the copyright registration for the “CAMEL COLLECTION” artwork. The petitioners relied on their earlier “CAMEL” artworks and trademark registrations. The Court held that they had to prove they were the first owner of the original artistic work, and had not done so, despite international copyright protection.

Facts of the Case

The petitioners are Japan Tobacco Inc. (Japan) and its affiliate Worldwide Brands Inc. (USA). They say their predecessor, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, adopted the “CAMEL” word and camel device for cigarettes in 1913, and registered it in India for tobacco goods (Class 34) in 1946. In the late 1970s, they say, the brand expanded into garments, bags, footwear and headgear, with Worldwide Brands holding the non-tobacco registrations.

According to the petitioners, in 1988 Worldwide Brands licensed Dornbusch GmbH and Co. GmbH and the Seidensticker Group of Companies, Germany, to make clothing under the CAMEL marks, with the right to outsource manufacture. In 1992, Dornbusch outsourced garment production to Gokaldas Exports in India, a sister concern of the first respondent, Mrs. Veena R. Hinduja, who they say was also its director and shareholder.

On 22 October 1997, the first respondent obtained Copyright Registration No. A-54242/97 for the artistic work “CAMEL COLLECTION,” claiming first publication in 1992. The petitioners claim that, with effect from 11 May 1999, Japan Tobacco acquired the group’s non-USA tobacco business and the non-tobacco CAMEL business.

The respondent pointed to an earlier order of the Registrar of Trade Marks, Chennai, between the parties, dated 28 January 2005, affirmed by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board on 15 March 2006 and the Madras High Court on 10 December 2008. The petitioners’ appeal is pending before the Supreme Court, with no stay. She also claimed that the petitioners left the Indian market in November 2011. Their trademark infringement suit, CS(COMM) 644/2018, Japan Tobacco v. D. Jhamnadas, was tagged with the petition for rectification.

Argument in Favour

The petitioners sought rectification of the Register of Copyrights under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957 as persons aggrieved by an entry wrongly made in, or remaining on, the Register. They argued that the respondent had merely lifted the “CAMEL” lettering and camel device and superimposed them, so she was not an “author” under Section 2(d)(iii), which defines the author of an artistic work as the artist, and the work lacked the originality Section 13 requires.

They relied on Section 40, which lets the Central Government extend Indian copyright to foreign works, read with the International Copyright Orders of 1991 and 1999 and the Berne Convention. In their view, publication in any convention country, such as Brazil, Norway or China, was enough to enforce copyright in India.

They argued that Gokaldas made CAMEL garments under the Dornbusch licence, so the respondent knew of their artworks before her claimed 1992 publication, and pointed to her written statement in the parallel suit as admissions. They said she had produced no proof of who created the work, and when, where and how, had not obtained the mandatory clearance certificate under Section 45(1), and had issued them no notice under Rule 16(3) of the Copyright Rules, 1958 (to which Rule 70(a) of the 2013 Rules is pari materia).

They relied on Marico Ltd. v. Mrs. Jagit Kaur, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8488, for the proposition that lack of originality is the test in rectification petitions, and that an artwork already registered as a trademark before its claimed publication lacks originality. They also cited Manju Singal Proprietor Singla Food Products v. Deepak Kumar and Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5503; Hugo Boss Trademark Management GmbH and Co. KG v. Sandeep Arora Trading as Arras The Boss and Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 79; and Triloki Nath Gupta v. Durga Prasad Gupta, (2004) 29 PTC 759.

Argument Against

The first respondent said she adopted “CAMEL COLLECTION” honestly in 1992 and registered the copyright in 1997. She said she also holds trademark registrations for garments, claiming use since 1 January 1992, and relied on sale invoices and advertisements from 1996. She said the artwork was designed by the in-house design department of Gokaldas Exports.

She objected that the petitioners were not persons aggrieved under Section 50, as they are neither the proprietors of any “CAMEL” or “CAMEL COLLECTION” trademark nor the holders of any copyright registration in India, and have never made, imported, advertised or sold garments under “CAMEL” there. She relied on the cross-examination of the petitioners’ witness in the parallel suit, who denied any imports or advertising and confirmed no sales in duty-free shops. She also said their Class 34 application, filed on a “proposed to be used” basis, was withdrawn after opposition.

She argued that trademark rights are strictly territorial, so foreign tobacco registrations give no rights over garments in India. She also relied on Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Tech Square Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 298/2022 (Delhi High Court, 3 February 2023), and Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd. and Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 5375-5377 of 2017 (Supreme Court, 14 December 2012).

She accepted that she had no documents showing how the artwork was conceived, but said that was understandable after so many years. She also relied on the earlier orders in her favour.

Court’s Decision

The Court held that the core issue is the establishment of an “original artistic work” and its “first owner.” Section 17 makes the author the first owner, subject to exceptions such as work made in the course of employment, where the employer is the first owner. First ownership must be established as a fact, and registering a trademark does not by itself make its owner the first owner of the copyright in the artwork.

The Court accepted that Section 40 and the International Copyright Order, 1999, remove national borders for copyright, subject to the Act, since a work first published abroad is treated as first published in India. This, however, does not help a petitioner who has not first shown that it is the first owner.

The petitioners had relied only on photocopied pages from three books: CAMEL Cigarette Collectibles – The Early Years: 1913-1963, CAMEL Cigarette Collectibles: 1964-1995 and LEGENDARY FOOTPRINTS – The Extraordinary Success of CAMEL Brand. These were not brought to the Court’s attention or proved in accordance with law, and the respondent had denied them in her affidavit dated 9 March 2023. Under Sections 101 to 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden shifts to the other side only once the party asserting a fact discharges its initial onus. The petitioners did not, so the respondent did not have to prove her own case. The Court added that Section 48 of the Copyright Act envisages a presumption in favour of the first respondent.

The Court did not accept the “admissions” in the respondent’s written statement in the parallel suit. That suit concerned trademark infringement, not copyright, and the statements were not unequivocal or clear. At best, they supported an inference, which could not establish first ownership.

The objections under Section 45(1) and Rule 70 were held to be academic once first ownership had failed. The Court also said it need not examine the judgments cited by either side, including Marico, Manju Singal, Hugo Boss, Triloki Nath Gupta and the two Toyota cases, because they did not bear on its analysis. The petition was dismissed, and the Court clarified that its remarks on the parallel suit do not affect the merits of that suit.

Conclusion

The judgment confirms that a petitioner who seeks removal of a registered copyright on the basis of its own earlier work must prove, by admissible evidence, that it first owns the original artwork. Books and trademark registrations cannot take the place of that proof.

Copyright’s cross-border reach does not relieve a claimant of proving first ownership, whereas trademark rights remain strictly territorial. Businesses relying on foreign creation or registration should keep evidence of authorship, employment or commissioning arrangements and first publication, and prove their documents formally in court.