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Introduction

In November 2025, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dealt with a case revolving around the trademark “DUNLOP” and with the question of whether an intra-court appeal is maintainable against an order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was asked to decide whether Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 bars such appeals and whether the Registrar of Trademarks can be treated as having the “trappings of a court.” The ruling is significant because it clarifies the scope of appellate remedies available to parties in trademark disputes.

Facts of the Case

The dispute began when Glorious Investment Limited applied for registration of the trademark “DUNLOP.” On 4 July 2024, the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks allowed the application, overruling objections raised by Dunlop International Limited. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Dunlop International Limited filed an appeal before the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 91 provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the Registrar may appeal to the High Court within three months.

On 11 June 2025, the Single Judge of the Intellectual Property Rights Division set aside the Registrar’s order and remanded the matter back to the Registrar for reconsideration, directing that all parties be given an opportunity of hearing. Glorious Investment Limited, aggrieved by this order, filed the present appeal before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The central issue before the Division Bench was whether such an intra-court appeal was legally maintainable.

Argument in Favour

Glorious Investment Limited argued that the appeal was maintainable. Their counsel submitted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies only to second appeals preferred against judgments or decrees passed by a Single Judge when exercising appellate power in respect of orders passed by Civil Courts under the Code. Since the Registrar of Trademarks is not a Civil Court, the bar under Section 100A should not apply.

It was further argued that the order of the Single Judge, passed in the Intellectual Property Rights Division, is appealable before the Division Bench under the Intellectual Property Division Rules of the Calcutta High Court, 2023. The appellant relied on the Delhi High Court’s decision in Promoshirt SM SA v. Armassuisse & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5531, which held that Section 100A applies only to appeals against decrees or orders of Civil Courts, not against orders of the Registrar of Trademarks. They also cited Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2972, where the Delhi High Court observed that nothing in the Trade Marks Act, 1999 excludes intra-court appeals under the Letters Patent.

Argument Against

The respondents, Dunlop International Limited and the Registrar of Trademarks, opposed the maintainability of the appeal. They contended that the present appeal, though labelled “TEMPAPO-IPD,” was in fact a second appeal, which is barred by law. They relied heavily on Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which expressly prohibits further appeals from judgments of a Single Judge, even if the Letters Patent otherwise permitted such appeals.

The respondents emphasized that the Trade Marks Act, 1999 contains no provision for a second appeal. Unlike the earlier Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which expressly allowed further appeals under Section 109(5), the 1999 Act omits such a provision. This omission, they argued, reflects legislative intent to exclude second appeals. They also referred to the Intellectual Property Division Rules of 2023, pointing out that Rule 2(o)(v) permits appeals only against original orders of the High Court, not appellate orders.

In support of their position, the respondents relied on several Supreme Court decisions. In Kamal Kumar Dutta & Anr. v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 613, the Court held that Section 100A CPC bars Letters Patent appeals against orders of a Single Judge, even when the order arose from an authority like the Company Law Board, which had “all the trappings of a court.” They also cited P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 11 SCC 672, Vasanthi v. Venugopal, (2017) 4 SCC 723, and Avtar Narain Behal v. Subhash Chander Behal, ILR (2009) II Delhi 411, all of which reinforced the principle that Section 100A overrides Letters Patent provisions.

Court’s Decision

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, holding that it was not maintainable.

The court first considered the precedent in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., (1953) 1 SCC 794. In that case, decided under the Trade Marks Act, 1940, the Supreme Court held that a Letters Patent appeal was maintainable because the Act provided for an appeal to the High Court but said “nothing more about it.” However, the Division Bench noted that this case was decided before Section 100A CPC was inserted in 2002.

The court emphasized that Section 100A CPC expressly bars further appeals from judgments of a Single Judge, notwithstanding the Letters Patent. Therefore, even if earlier precedent allowed intra-court appeals, Section 100A now overrides that position.

The Division Bench applied the “trappings of a court” test, drawing from Kamal Kumar Dutta (2006) 7 SCC 613. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Company Law Board had all the trappings of a court, and therefore Section 100A applied. The Division Bench examined the powers of the Registrar of Trademarks under Section 127 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Registrar has powers similar to a Civil Court, including receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing witness attendance, compelling production of documents, imposing costs, and reviewing decisions. The Registrar also has a duty to act judicially in deciding disputes, such as opposition proceedings under Section 21. On this basis, the court concluded that the Registrar has almost all the trappings of a court, making Section 100A applicable.

The court also considered legislative intent. The predecessor statute, the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, expressly allowed second appeals under Section 109(5). The omission of such a provision in the 1999 Act indicates that the legislature intended to exclude further appeals.

Finally, the Division Bench addressed conflicting precedents. It respectfully disagreed with the Delhi High Court’s view in Promoshirt SM SA (2023), holding that Section 100A does extend to appeals filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It distinguished Resilient Innovations (2023), noting that it concerned rectification proceedings under Section 57, which are original proceedings and therefore outside the purview of Section 100A.

Accordingly, the Division Bench held that intra-court appeals are barred in such cases and dismissed the appeal.

Conclusion

The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has provided a decisive clarification on the scope of appellate remedies in trademark disputes. By holding that intra-court appeals are not maintainable against orders of a Single Judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court has reinforced the principle of finality in appellate adjudication. The reasoning rests on three pillars: the express bar contained in Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the recognition that the Registrar of Trademarks exercises powers with the trappings of a court, and the deliberate legislative omission of a second appellate provision in the 1999 Act, which had been present in the earlier 1958 statute.

The judgment carefully reconciles earlier precedents. While National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. (1953) 1 SCC 794 had permitted Letters Patent appeals in trademark matters, that decision was rendered before the insertion of Section 100A CPC. The subsequent ruling in Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 613, which extended the bar to quasi-judicial bodies with court-like powers, was found to be more apposite in the present statutory framework. By applying the “trappings of a court” test, the Division Bench concluded that the Registrar’s functions are sufficiently judicial in nature to attract the prohibition under Section 100A.

The Court also addressed conflicting High Court decisions, particularly those of the Delhi High Court in Promoshirt SM SA v. Armassuisse (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5531) and Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 2972). While acknowledging these authorities, the Division Bench distinguished them on the basis of statutory context and the nature of proceedings, ultimately declining to follow their reasoning. This demonstrates a conscious effort to ensure consistency with Supreme Court jurisprudence and legislative intent.