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Introduction

On 23 May 2025, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, in Under Armour Inc. v. Anish Agarwal & Anr. (FAO(OS)(COMM) 174/2024), set aside an order of a Single Judge which had refused to grant an interim injunction to Under Armour. The U.S.-based sportswear company alleged that the respondents’ use of the marks ‘AERO ARMOUR’ and ‘AERO ARMR’ infringed its registered trademark ‘UNDER ARMOUR’ and other associated marks, amounting to passing off and dilution.

The Court found a prima facie likelihood of confusion, even if limited to the initial stage, and held that the respondents’ adoption of the marks was lacking in good faith.

Facts of the Case

Under Armour, Inc., founded in 1996, is engaged in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of sportswear, casual apparel, footwear, and accessories worldwide. It owns multiple registrations in India for the marks ‘UNDER ARMOUR’, ‘UA’, and various ‘ARMOUR’-formative marks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 in Class 25 (clothing, footwear, headgear) and other classes. Although it has not registered the standalone word ‘ARMOUR’ in India, it holds such registrations in several foreign jurisdictions. The company entered the Indian market in 2017 through Amazon Fashion and opened its first retail store in 2019.

The respondents, an Indian apparel company promoted by Respondent No. 1, market clothing and footwear under the mark ‘AERO ARMOUR’, operate the website www.aeroarmour.store, and applied for registration of the word mark in Class 25. Under Armour opposed this application before the Trade Marks Registry, alleging deceptive similarity.

While opposition proceedings were pending, Under Armour instituted a suit seeking to restrain the respondents from using ‘AERO ARMOUR’, ‘AERO ARMR’, or any deceptively similar mark. On 29 May 2024, the Single Judge declined to grant an ad interim injunction but imposed certain restrictions, including a prohibition on using “ARMR”, restrictions on placing the mark on sleeves, a bar on entry into sportswear, and a requirement to use the device mark rather than the word mark on the outside layer of apparel.

The Single Judge held that Under Armour had no exclusive rights over the word ‘ARMOUR’ in India, as it was not registered standalone. It was noted that Under Armour had earlier argued before the Registry that ‘UNDER ARMOUR’ should be viewed in its entirety and was dissimilar to other ‘ARMOUR’ marks. Applying the anti-dissection rule, the Single Judge concluded that ‘UNDER ARMOUR’ and ‘AERO ARMOUR’ were not similar when viewed as a whole. The court also distinguished the goods as sportswear and casual wear, noted the significant price difference, and considered the modern consumer to be sufficiently informed to discern the difference despite initial curiosity.

Arguments in Favour

Under Armour contended that the Single Judge misapplied the doctrine of Initial Interest Confusion (IIC). This doctrine recognises that confusion at the initial stage before a purchase is finalised, can still constitute infringement. Even if the consumer ultimately realises the difference, the harm lies in the temporary diversion of attention and goodwill.

It was argued that the impugned marks are visually, phonetically, and structurally similar to ‘UNDER ARMOUR’, with the shared word ‘ARMOUR’ being the dominant element. The adoption of ‘AERO ARMR’ and the placement of ‘AERO ARMOUR’ on sleeves, mirroring Under Armour’s usage, was presented as evidence of dishonest intent.

Under Armour maintained that the goods in question are identical both being apparel in Class 25 and are sold through the same online channels, including Amazon and Myntra, making the distinction between sportswear and casual wear artificial. The company emphasised its global and Indian reputation, substantial turnover, and wide recognition, which, it argued, entitled it to stronger trademark protection. It also warned that lower-priced competing products risk diluting its brand value.

Arguments Against

The respondents asserted that Under Armour had no proprietary right over the standalone word ‘ARMOUR’, and when removed, the words ‘UNDER’ and ‘AERO’ are neither phonetically nor visually similar. They argued that the marks as a whole are visually and structurally different, with their goods inspired by military and aviation themes, distinct from Under Armour’s products.

Respondent No. 1, an aeronautical pilot, claimed that ‘AERO’ derived from aeronautics and ‘ARMOUR’ was used in its ordinary descriptive sense. The logo, comprising a shield, airplane, and stripes, reflected this inspiration. A search had been conducted prior to adoption, and ‘AERO ARMOUR’ was found to be unregistered.

The respondents contended that they operate in a different market segment, producing casual wear rather than sportswear, and that many third parties use ‘ARMOUR’ in trademarks for apparel, reducing the likelihood of confusion. They claimed limited and discontinued use of ‘ARMR’ and stated that the sleeve placement of the mark was an isolated occurrence.

Court’s Decision

The Division Bench allowed the appeal and granted an interim injunction, restraining the respondents from using ‘AERO ARMOUR’, ‘AERO ARMR’, or any mark deceptively similar to ‘UNDER ARMOUR’ until the disposal of the suit.

The Court considered Sections 29(1), 29(2), and 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 29(1) provides that infringement occurs when an identical or deceptively similar mark is used for registered goods or services in a manner likely to be taken as a trademark. Section 29(2) covers cases where similarity of marks and goods is likely to cause confusion or association. Section 29(4) applies to reputed marks, even for dissimilar goods, where use is unfair or detrimental to the mark’s distinctiveness or reputation.

The Court held that the Single Judge had misapplied the anti-dissection rule. While marks must be compared as wholes, it is permissible to consider the dominant components when assessing similarity. Ignoring ‘ARMOUR’ as a dominant part was erroneous. The Court cited M/s South India Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1953; Pinto v. Badman, (1891) 8 RPC 181; and Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 558. It further referred to Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirat Vinodbhai Jadvani, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4255-DB, which acknowledged the role of dominant parts in composite marks.

The Court found strong visual and phonetic similarity between the marks, with both being two-word, capitalised, non-hyphenated expressions sharing the identical second word. It noted Under Armour’s extensive goodwill and reputation, referring to Hamdard National Foundation v. Sadar Laboratories, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4523, and Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Industries, 963 F.2d 350, to emphasise that well-known marks merit a broader scope of protection.

The distinction between sportswear and casual wear was rejected, as both parties sell identical categories of apparel under Class 25 through the same trade channels. The Court relied on Vishnudas Trading v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co., (1997) 4 SCC 201, to note that differences within a class must be material, which they were not in this case.

On the IIC doctrine, the Court clarified that momentary confusion is actionable as it misappropriates goodwill, citing Grotrian v. Steinway, 365 F. Supp. 707; Google LLC v. DRS Logistics, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4809; Institute Europeen D’Administration des Affaires (INSEAD) v. Fullstack Education, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3016; and its own decision in Under Armour v. Aditya Birla Fashion & Retail Ltd., 2023:DHC:2711.

The adoption of the impugned marks was held to be prima facie dishonest, especially in light of the respondents’ likely awareness of Under Armour’s global reputation. The Court referred to Midas Hygiene Industries v. Sudhir Bhatia, (2004) 3 SCC 90, to underline that dishonest adoption ordinarily warrants an injunction.

Conclusion

The Division Bench concluded that the Single Judge’s refusal of interim relief was unsustainable. The marks were found to be deceptively similar, the goods identical, and the trade channels overlapping, creating a real likelihood of confusion, including at the initial interest stage. The adoption of the impugned marks was not bona fide, and the respondents were restrained from their use pending trial. This decision shows us that strong and reputed trademarks are entitled to enhanced protection, that dominant components of marks cannot be ignored in similarity assessments, and that initial interest confusion remains a valid ground for interim relief in trademark disputes.