For more intellectual property updates follow our WHATSAPP CHANNEL and SUNS LEGAL | LinkedIn

Introduction

In Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Kwick Living (I) Private Limited, CS(COMM) 904/2026, the Delhi High Court on 25th August 2026 examined whether it had territorial jurisdiction over a suit by HUL against Kwick Living over an advertisement campaign HUL claimed disparaged its products Vim and Surf Excel. Rather than deciding the dispute on merits, the Court surveyed a conflicting line of judgments on when a company may sue outside its main office, especially where the alleged wrong is online and visible nationwide, and, finding the precedents hard to reconcile, referred the question to a Larger Bench.

Facts of the Case

HUL sought a permanent injunction restraining Kwick Living from broadcasting or publishing an advertisement campaign titled “War on What’s Hidden,” run on billboards, YouTube, Instagram, and the defendant’s website, which HUL alleged denigrated Vim and Surf Excel through unsubstantiated claims. Kwick Living objected to the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, and reply and rejoinder followed on 20th and 24th August 2026, with judgment reserved on the limited jurisdiction question on 24th August 2026.

Both parties have their registered offices in Mumbai. HUL’s plaint disclosed only one instance of the advertisement, on a hoarding in Mumbai, with no Delhi hoarding identified and no bill or invoice showing sales of the defendant’s products in Delhi. As the suit was filed directly before the Delhi High Court’s original civil jurisdiction, no lower court decision was involved.

Argument in Favour

HUL argued that jurisdiction lay in Delhi because part of the cause of action had arisen there under Section 20(c) of the CPC: the campaign was disseminated through social media accessible in Delhi, and the defendant’s webpage, which hosted it, also allowed sale of its competing products to Delhi consumers.

Relying on Burger King Corpn. v. Techchand Shewakramani, (2018) 1 HCC (Del) 64, HUL argued that Sections 134(2) and 62(2) add to, not exclude, Section 20 CPC, and that trade mark “use” includes advertising, so a cause of action arises wherever such material is accessible. It also relied on Kohinoor Seed Fields India (P) Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727, and World Wrestling Entertainment, for the proposition that a website capable of concluding a transaction “carries on business” wherever accessible.

HUL also cited Nilesh Girkar v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6040, for the proposition that nationwide communication creates a cause of action wherever locally accessible, and Astral Ltd. v. Ajay Enterprises, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 10065, for concurrent jurisdiction where the cause of action arises in part at both offices.

It further argued that the Explanation to Section 20 CPC, deeming a corporation to carry on business at a subordinate office where the cause of action arises there, applies only to clauses (a) and (b), not (c); and that Sanjay Dalia construed only Sections 134 and 62, not Section 20.

Argument Against

Kwick Living opposed jurisdiction, submitting that HUL had neither pleaded nor proved any cause of action or sale within Delhi, the only hoarding identified being in Mumbai. Relying on Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161, it argued that where the cause of action arises at the plaintiff’s principal office – here Mumbai – the plaintiff must sue only there, not at a mere subordinate office such as Delhi.

It relied on Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376, applying Sanjay Dalia to hold a subordinate office cannot found jurisdiction where the principal office and cause of action are both at one place. On internet jurisdiction, it relied on Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, requiring “purposeful availment” through specific targeting and injury, also followed in Federal Express Corporation v. FedEx Securities Limited & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7824.

It further cited Escorts Limited v. Tejpal Singh Sisodia, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7607, cautioning against readings letting a plaintiff sue anywhere because harm might theoretically be felt everywhere, and argued that letting HUL sue in Delhi solely because its advertisement was visible online would amount to “court shopping,” HUL being bound to sue only in Mumbai.

Court’s Decision

The Court explained the issue turned on three provisions: Section 20(c) of the CPC, permitting suit where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, its Explanation extending “carrying on business” to a subordinate office where the cause of action arises there; and Sections 134(2) and 62(2), which similarly let a plaintiff sue where it carries on business.

Examining Sanjay Dalia, the Court read it as purposive and restrictive – meant only to spare a plaintiff inconvenience, not let it bypass its principal office, where the cause of action has also arisen, for a distant subordinate office. Ultra Home Construction was discussed for systematising this into a four-scenario framework, under which a plaintiff’s forum turns on where among its offices the cause of action arose.

Banyan Tree was discussed for its strict internet test requiring purposeful targeting and actual injury before mere website accessibility could found jurisdiction. Burger King was discussed as contrary, treating advertising itself as “use” creating a cause of action wherever visible, in tension with Banyan Tree.

Kohinoor Seed Fields was discussed as going further, holding that a website merely capable of concluding transactions shows business carried on wherever accessible, drawing on World Wrestling Entertainment. Nilesh Girkar and Astral Ltd. were discussed similarly – the former on nationwide streaming, the latter on concurrent jurisdiction at both offices – both in tension with the narrower readings in Banyan Tree and Sanjay Dalia.

Surveying these authorities, the Court observed that the internet’s growth could not dilute territorial jurisdiction to a point where a company could sue almost anywhere simply because its website is accessible there, while recognising that Sections 134 and 62 could support a broader reading. It referred three questions to a Larger Bench: whether such suits are governed by Section 20 CPC, Section 134, Section 62, or an interplay of all three; whether a corporate plaintiff must sue only where its principal office is situated when part of the cause of action arose there; and what rule should govern online IP transactions, directing the Registry to place the judgment before the Chief Justice within one week.

Subsequent Developments

HUL appealed the denial of interim relief. On 2nd September 2026, a Division Bench (FAO(OS)(COMM) 231/2026) held Section 20(a) and 20(c) CPC satisfied, relying on Kwick Living’s own affidavit disclosing a Delhi GST registration and declared Delhi place of business, plus hoardings in Delhi – while declining to disturb the Larger Bench reference. The matter was remanded, and on 10th September 2026 the Single Judge granted HUL an interim injunction, holding the campaign prima facie crossed into actionable disparagement. The Larger Bench reference on jurisdiction remains pending.

Conclusion

This judgment does not resolve the dispute but performs a more foundational function, acknowledging that the law on territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property and disparagement disputes has become genuinely unsettled in the digital era. It traces how a restrictive Supreme Court precedent meant to spare plaintiffs inconvenience has come to be read in markedly different ways by different benches of the same High Court, particularly regarding advertisements visible nationwide the moment they go online. Referring the matter to a Larger Bench ensures the eventual ruling will carry greater authority, rather than leaving litigants to guess which precedent a bench might follow.